




World Order Under Law
Report to the House of Delegatest
International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank Group*
RECOMMENDATION
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association recommends that the United
States government:
(a) Give strong support to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
Group and provide assistance in the ongoing scrutiny of their operations;
(b) Support the International Monetary Fund undertaking a thorough re-
examination of the IMF role vis-A-vis international capital movements
and private international capital markets, including consideration of an
enhanced role for the IMF in the monitoring and appropriate regulation
of international capital movements and capital market operations in order
to achieve a principal purpose of its charter: the promotion of a stable
system of exchange rates in the world economy; and
(c) Support the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group giving
increased attention to the development of the legal systems in member
tThe following Recommendations and Reports are two of six developed by the Section's Interna-
tional Institutions Committee through its Working Group on United Nations Specialized Agencies.
The remaining four reports-on the International Labor Organization, the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the World Health Organiza-
tion-will be published in the Fall 1996 issue of The International Lawyer.
*This Recommendation and Report was approved by the House of Delegates in February 1996.
It supersedes the recommendation and report on the same subject adopted in August 1995.
H. Francis Shattuck, Jr., Chair, Richard W. Edwards, Rapporteur, John W. Head, Stephen Zamora,
Michael A. Heller, John F. Murphy, and Louis B. Sohn were principally responsible for this report.
442 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
countries, particularly those countries undergoing major institutional re-
form.
REPORT
A. The IMF and the World Bank Group-Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group are the
subjects of this report. The report, with its accompanying recommendation, is
one of several reports on selected United Nations specialized agencies and the
International Atomic Energy Agency. The report has been developed by the
Section of International Law and Practice, International Institutions Committee,
through its Working Group on UN Specialized Agencies. This is a contribution
to the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations in fulfillment of the American
Bar Association's Goal VIII-to advance the rule of law in the world. The accom-
panying recommendation addresses issues of an enhanced role of the IMF in
promoting a more stable system of exchange rates, legal technical assistance to
member countries of the IMF and the World Bank Group undertaking institutional
reform, and the support by the United States to the IMF and the World Bank
Group.
Of all the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, perhaps the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group have the highest profile and
draw the most attention, both favorable and unfavorable. They stand at the center
of the international economic system. This report addresses a few key matters
that appear crucial to the future of the IMF and the World Bank Group-with
particular emphasis on issues that have a legal aspect. The report begins with a
limited set of conclusions and recommendations. It then presents facts and findings
that support these recommendations. The Working Group has concluded that on
balance, these institutions make valuable contributions to the global economic
order and deserve continued support from the United States, including financial
support.
B. Conclusions and Recommendations
(1) THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK
GROUP
(a) The United States should continue to give strong support, including finan-
cial support, to the IMF and the World Bank Group. The United States
should consider increasing its level of financial contributions to the Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA), the entity of the World Bank Group
that provides assistance to the poorest countries of the world.
(b) Coupled with continuing U.S. support, however, should be continuing
scrutiny, in order to encourage the IMF and the World Bank Group to
make further improvements in certain areas. These include:
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-giving adequate attention to the impact on the environment-both physi-
cal and human-of projects financed with World Bank resources;
-incorporating the views and input of beneficiaries and nongovernmental
organizations in the identification and implementation of projects sup-
ported by the World Bank;
-providing adequate disclosure of information to earn confidence, among
governments and in the public generally, as to the fairness and appropri-
ateness of World Bank and IMF actions; and
-emphasizing legal reform in their member countries, as discussed in
more detail in point (3)(b) below.
(c) When change is needed in the IMF or World Bank Group, the United
States should seek to build a consensus for change and should avoid, to
the extent possible, unilateral actions, such as threats to withhold or condi-
tion U.S. financial support.
(2) NEW AREAS OF EMPHASIS FOR THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK GROUP
(a) The IMF Executive Board should undertake a thorough re-examination
of the IMF's role vis-A-vis international capital movements and private
international capital markets. Such a re-examination should include consid-
eration of an enhanced role for the IMF in the monitoring and appropriate
regulation of international capital movements and capital market operations
in order to achieve one of the principal purposes of its charter: the promo-
tion of a stable system of exchange rates in the world economy.
(b) Both the IMF and the World Bank Group should give increased attention
to the development of the legal systems in their member countries, particu-
larly in those countries undergoing major institutional reform, by providing
competent legal advice on the application of effective legal structures to
local cultural and legal traditions. Technical assistance (including that pro-
vided by the ABA's Central and East European Law Initiative) should be
part of coordinated efforts, such as that exemplified by the Joint Vienna
Institute.
(3) THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE IMF AND
THE WORLD BANK GROUP
(a) No major change in the relationships between the United Nations and the
IMF and the World Bank Group is necessary. Specifically, there is no
need to revise the relationship agreements between the organizations.
(b) The United Nations General Assembly and other organizations or groups
of countries should resist the temptation to politicize these institutions-
that is, to press the IMF and the World Bank Group to take actions that
are not central to those institutions' economic and monetary objectives,
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such as meting out punishments or rewards to countries for adopting partic-
ular ideologies.
(c) The IMF should establish a procedure or mechanism, perhaps similar to
the Inspection Panel of the World Bank, to assure internal and external
accountability.
C. A Map of the Institutional Landscape: The IMF and the World Bank
Group in a Nutshell
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)' and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD)2 were created by agreements negotiated at
an international financial conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,
in July 1944. The conference took place while World War II was in progress
and a year before the San Francisco Conference that created the United Nations.
Two financial institutions affiliated with IBRD have been created: the Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA)3 and the International Finance Corporation
(IFC).4 In addition, two multilateral treaties, one relating to the guarantee of
private investments against noncommercial risks and the other to the settlement
of investment disputes, were negotiated under the auspices of the IBRD and are
administered by Bank personnel: the Convention Establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 5 and the Convention on the Settlement
1. The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund have been amended on three
occasions, most recently effective Nov. 11, 1992. The texts appear at: original Articles, formulated
July 22, 1944, effective Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 3 Bevans 1351, TIAS No. 1501, 2 UNTS
39; first amendment effective July 28, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2775, TIAS No. 6748, 726 UNTS 266;
second amendment (which substituted a complete new text of articles and schedules in place of the
former text) effective April 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, TIAS No. 8937, __ UNTS __ ; third
amendment effective Nov. 11, 1992, TIAS No. 11898, 31 I.L.M. 1307.
For general background on the IMF, written from a legal perspective, see RICHARD W. EDWARDS.
JR., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION (1985). See also IMF Treasurer's Dept., Finan-
cial Organization and Operations of the IMF, IMF Pamphlet Series, No. 45 (2d ed., 1991).
2. The Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
have been amended once, effective Dec. 17, 1965. The original Articles, formulated July 22, 1944,
effective Dec. 27, 1945, appear at 60 Stat. 1440, 3 Bevans 1390, TIAS No. 1502, 2 UNTS 134.
The amendment effective Dec. 17, 1965, appears at 16 U.S.T. 1942, TIAS No. 5929, 606 UNTS
294.
For general background on the IBRD, written from a legal perspective, see IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA,
THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD (1991).
3. Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, done Jan. 26, 1960,
effective Sept. 24, 1960. 11 U.S.T. 2284, TIAS No. 4607, 439 UNTS 249. For general background,
see SHIHATA, id.
4. The Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation have been amended on
two occasions, most recently effective Sept. 1, 1965. The texts appear at: original Articles, done
May 25, 1955, effective July 20, 1956, 7 U.S.T. 2197, TIAS No. 3620, 264 UNTS 117; first
amendment effective Sept. 21, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 2945, TIAS No. 4894, 439 UNTS 318; second
amendment, effective Sept. 1, 1965, 24 U.S.T. 1760, TIAS No. 7683, 563 UNTS 362.
5. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), done Oct.
11, 1985, entered into force April 12, 1988. TIAS No. _ _, 24 I.L.M. 1598.
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of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID).6
The IBRD and IDA together are often referred to as the "World Bank," and
these two organizations plus the IFC, MIGA, and ICSID are known as the "World
Bank Group." A state cannot be a member of the IBRD without also being a
member of the IMF, although the reverse is possible.
The IMF, IBRD, IDA, and IFC are international organizations whose members
are nation states. Each organization has nearly universal membership (177 mem-
ber states in the IBRD, for example) and each organization has a somewhat
unique mission. The IMF, IBRD, IDA, and the IBRD on behalf of the IFC have
relationship agreements with the United Nations, described below.
(1) THE IMF
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is primarily concerned with interna-
tional monetary problems and issues, and related balance-of-payments problems
of its members in the short-to-medium term. The IMF's concern is with rich as
well as poor countries (e.g., the United States has significantly benefited from
IMF financial assistance, most recently in 1978 as described below). Although
the public perceives the IMF as primarily a lending institution, it does not in a
technical sense "make loans." It buys and sells currencies in arrangements with
members that have the financial effect of "loans." The sources of funds used
by the IMF come from paid-in quota subscriptions of member countries and
borrowings by the IMF from national governments and their central banks. The
IMF has not borrowed in the public market.
The IMF is the issuer of a monetary reserve asset called the Special Drawing
Right or "SDR." The SDR can only be owned and used by official entities, not
by private parties. In dealings of governments and other official holders, the
SDR functions much like a national currency. As the issuer of the SDR, the IMF
at the international level plays a role somewhat comparable to a national central
bank in national economies. The SDR is also the unit of account of the IMF and
a number of other international organizations. It is currently valued in relation
to an index consisting of five widely used national currencies. On April 3, 1995,
the SDR had a value of U.S.$1.566.
Relatively few members of the public are aware that the IMF, in addition to
its financial operations, plays regulatory roles-what have been called "rule-
creating" and "rule-enforcing" roles. The IMF administers what are informally
called "rules of good conduct" in international monetary affairs. These rules,
which are set forth or have their basis in the IMF's Articles of Agreement, relate
to such matters as exchange rate arrangements, national restrictions on currencies
6. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, done March 18, 1965, entered into force Oct. 14, 1966. 17 U.S.T. 1270, TIAS No. 6090,
575 UNTS 159.
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and payments, sharing of information, and obligations of members to cooperate
and collaborate in dealing with international monetary problems. The IMF holds
consultations with each of its members regularly in which the member country's
exchange rate arrangements and currency exchange restrictions are reviewed.
While the IMF does not directly regulate the activities of private parties, Article
VIII, sec. 2(b), of the IMF's Articles of Agreement requires member countries
to assure that their administrative authorities and courts not enforce private con-
tracts that are contrary to exchange control regulations of another member where
those controls are consistent with the IMF Articles. The Bretton Woods
Agreements Act of the United States makes that provision of Article VIII directly
applicable to litigation in U.S. courts. 7 It is also directly applicable in the courts
of other IMF members. The provision has spawned an extensive jurisprudence
in the state and federal courts of the United States.
(2) THE WORLD BANK GROUP
In the field of development finance from public sources, the World Bank Group
has been, and continues to be, the dominant institution in the world. As noted
above, the founding institution, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), has evolved into five organizations. Three of these are
complementary financial organizations, each created by multilateral agreement
of nation states: the IBRD, the International Development Association (IDA),
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The World Bank Group also
includes two organizations of a highly legal character related to private invest-
ment: the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nation-
als of Other States (ICSID).
IBRD: The IBRD is the oldest and largest of the World Bank Group organiza-
tions. Under its Articles, it can only lend to governments or with government
guarantee. For practical purposes, this means that virtually all of the Bank's
loans are to governmental entities. Most IBRD loans in recent years have been
made in support of projects in what might be called the "middle group" of
developing countries. These are not the poorest countries. Nor are they the richer
developing countries that have ready access to international capital markets. Total
IBRD lending since its establishment amounts to around $300 billion. In the fiscal
year ended April 30, 1994, the IBRD approved loans totaling $14.2 billion.
The vast bulk of the funds loaned by the IBRD have been obtained through
borrowings by the Bank on the international capital market, where its bonds
enjoy an AAA credit rating. In general, the Bank borrows long-term and loans
medium-to-long term. In many cases, the Bank is able to borrow on the interna-
tional market at low enough rates so that, even after expenses and a modest
7. 22 U.S.C. § 286h.
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"profit," it can loan to member governments at substantially lower rates that
those at which they could borrow in the market.
IDA: Because the interest rates on IBRD loans to its members are keyed to
the interest rates paid by the Bank on its own borrowings and expenses, the rates
are higher than many of the poorest members most in need of development capital
can afford. These are also countries shunned by productive private investment
(except sometimes in extractive industries). In 1960 the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA) was formed. As explained below, it is institutionally
associated with the IBRD. It is primarily financed by what are called "replen-
ishments," which essentially are funds periodically donated by member states.
IDA makes loans (called "credits") to the poorest of the developing countries
for projects of "high developmental priority." 8 The credits are often for the
very-long term-usually 35-40 years. They carry no interest charges but do have
a small service charge. Often, IBRD loans and IDA credits are blended into a
package. IDA has concentrated its assistance on the poorest countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and south Asia. In the fiscal year ended April 30, 1994, IDA
approved credits totaling $6.6 billion.
IFC: As noted above, the IBRD is only authorized to make loans to governments
or with government guarantee of repayment. Although not required by its Articles,
the IDA normally only makes loans to governmental bodies. Because it is rarely
appropriate for a government to guarantee the commercial success of a private
enterprise, in the mid-1950s the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was
formed to assist the financing of private enterprise in developing countries. The
IFC, which is affiliated with the IBRD, is authorized to make loans and take
equity positions in enterprises whether or not there is governmental participation
in the enterprise. The IFC is not limited in its financing techniques. Article III,
section 2, of the IFC's Articles of Agreement provides: "The Corporation may
make investments of its funds in such form or forms as it may deem appropriate
in the circumstances." The IFC obtains its funds primarily through borrowings
in the international capital market and sales of participations in its investments.
The IFC is the World Bank Group institution that has sustained the most growth
in percentage terms in recent years. It is currently approving new loans and
investments at a rate of about $2.5 billion a year, and within five years the rate
is expected to double to about $5 billion. It is estimated that each dollar of IFC
investment leverages about $6 in other private investment.
MIGA and ICSID: The World Bank Group, in addition to developing interna-
tional law as it relates to public lending, has worked to develop international
legal structures to encourage and protect productive private investment. As noted
earlier, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), affiliated with
the World Bank, issues insurance to private investors against noncommercial
8. IDA Articles, Art. I.
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risks. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
also affiliated with the Bank, provides an arbitration forum for resolving invest-
ment disputes between foreign private investors and host governments.
(3) How THESE INSTITUTIONS DIRECTLY BENEFIT THE UNITED STATES AND
U.S. TAXPAYERS
It seems appropriate to correct the common misapprehension that the IMF and
the entities in the World Bank Group constitute huge financial drains on the U.S.
Treasury. These institutions produce a net economic gain for the United States.
In the case of the IMF, the payments made by the U.S. Treasury in support
of the U.S. subscription in that institution are in reality only an exchange of
assets (dollars for SDRs), which the United States can readily reverse. Indeed,
unconditional drawing rights of the U.S. in the IMF are included in official
statements of U.S. monetary reserves. Moreover, the IMF pays interest (techni-
cally called "remuneration") to the United States for the IMF's use of its dollar
holdings in making financial transfers to other countries. The United States has
actually made money from its membership in the IMF.
In the case of the World Bank Group, the picture is more complicated but the
effect is similar. More money flows into the United States as a result of its
participation in the IBRD, IFC, and IDA than flows out in the way of subscriptions
and contributions. First, as for the IBRD and IFC, only small proportions of the
U.S. subscriptions have had to be paid in. The remainder is "callable." Because
of the strong financial position of these institutions, it is doubtful that the callable
capital will ever be called in. As for IDA, although the contributions are relatively
large, the tangible return is also large. That "return" takes the form of payments
made to U.S. businesses that win contracts for goods and services required under
projects financed by loans supported by the World Bank Group. A recent report
of the Treasury Department stated that in 1993 the amounts paid by the United
States-about $2.7 billion-was less than the amounts coming back into the U.S.
private sector through such contracts-about $5.0 billion. 9
D. The IMF and the World Bank Group-Structure and Organization
The IMF, IBRD, IDA, and IFC have governing structures that are somewhat
different from most other nonfinancial international organizations. For one thing,
weighted voting is used, as distinct from the one-state one-vote structure in, say,
the UN General Assembly. A member country's voting power in the IMF, IBRD,
IDA, and IFC is based on its financial subscription in the organization, which
9. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS: INCREASING U.S. Ex-
PORTS AND CREATING U. S. JOBS (1994). See also John W. Head, International Business Opportunities
with the World Bank and Other Development Banks, __ INT'L CONTRACT ADVISOR
(forthcoming).
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in turn is related to the country's international economic position. Currently, the
United States holds about 17% of the votes in all of these organizations, with
Japan, Germany, the UK, and France each having about 5 % or 6% of the votes.
(1) GOVERNING STRUCTURES OF THE IMF AND THE IBRD
The IMF and the IBRD each has as its highest organ a plenary body (called
a "board of governors") in which each member state is represented by a governor
and alternate governor. However, the plenary body usually meets only once a
year (the annual combined meeting of the IMF and World Bank) and then meets
only for a week. Below the board of governors, the IMF and the IBRD each has
an executive board. The executive boards are legally in continuous session and,
in fact, meet once or more times a week. The Managing Director of the IMF
and the President of the World Bank preside at meetings of the respective executive
board. The executive boards both make policy decisions of general applicability
(e.g., the terms under which financial assistance will be made available to member
countries) and the decisions relating to specific member countries (e.g., the ap-
proval of individual IMF stand-by arrangements and World Bank loans).
There are currently 24 executive directors of the IMF and 24 executive directors
of the World Bank. A few countries (generally those having the largest subscrip-
tions) are represented by individual directors who represent one country only.
However, most member countries are represented by executive directors who
represent groups of countries. Voting in the executive boards, as in the boards
of governors, is by weighted voting. However, in the executive board, a director
cannot split his votes where states the director represents have different views-
the votes of each director are cast as a lot. Except on matters where special
majorities are required (e.g., 70 % of the weighted voting power), most decisions
are in fact made on the basis of consensus as assessed by the chairman of the
board (Managing Director of IMF or President of World Bank).
(2) GOVERNING STRUCTURES OF THE IDA AND THE IFC
The governing structure of the International Development Association (IDA),
in accordance with its charter's design, is virtually identical to that of the IBRD
and the same persons serve as President, governors, and executive directors of
the two organizations. o
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) does not have an executive board
but has, similar to private corporations, what is called a "board of directors."
The membership of the IFC's board of directors is basically the same as the
membership of the IBRD's executive board. The President of the IBRD is the
chairman of the IFC's board of directors. The IFC has its own President, who
10. IDA Articles, Art. VI.
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is appointed by its Board of Governors on recommendation of the President of
the IBRD. "
(3) MANAGEMENT AND STAFF
The Managing Director and staff of the IMF and President and staff of the
World Bank Group play relatively more important roles in the organizations
compared to the secretary-generals and staffs of many other international organi-
zations. Staff members negotiate directly on behalf of the organizations with
officials in the governments of member states. The staffs are highly expert. Their
expertise rivals, and often exceeds, the expertise of staffs in the finance ministries,
central banks, and development agencies of member states, including even the
most powerful of those states. Further, because of the information obligations
of member states under Article VIII, sec. 5, of the IMF Articles of Agreement,
the staffs have knowledge of a great deal of information and data about national
economies.
In accordance with IDA's Articles of Association, the officers and staff of the
IBRD are, to the extent practicable, appointed to serve concurrently as officers
and staff of IDA. 2 Although the IBRD provides administrative services to the
IFC, the staff of the IFC is legally independent of the Bank's staff.
E. The "A-Political" Focus of the IMF and the World Bank Group
The charters of the IMF and entities of the World Bank Group are intended
to restrict the effects of political considerations in decision making. The Articles
of Agreement of the IBRD provides:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor
shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions,
and these considerations shall be weighed impartially ....
The Articles of Agreement of the IMF prohibits the organization from publish-
ing a report critical of changes in "the fundamental structure of the economic
organization" of a member" 4-e.g., changes from a capitalist to a socialist orienta-
tion (or vice versa).
Careful adherence to the organization's constitution is a principle that has
historically figured prominently in decision making in the IMF and World Bank.
The legal departments of the organizations have played important roles in the
development and operations of the organizations. The Articles of Agreement of
the International Monetary Fund has been amended three times-in large part
11. IFC Articles, Art. IV.
12. IDA Articles, Art. VI, sec. 5(6).
13. IBRD Articles, Art. IV, sec. 10.
14. IMF Articles, Art. XII, sec. 8.
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to clearly establish the authority of the IMF and to avoid controversy about what
some might otherwise view as excessively flexible interpretations of a founding
instrument. Similar concerns to assure legality have guided decisions in the World
Bank Group.
F. Relationships of the IMF and the World Bank Group
with the United Nations
The IMF, IBRD, IDA and the IBRD on behalf of the IFC have formal relation-
ship agreements with the United Nations in accordance with Article 63 of the
UN Charter. 15 While these organizations are "specialized agencies" in terms of
Article 57 of the UN Charter, the organizations rarely describe themselves as
"specialized agencies" and never as "agencies of the United Nations." The UN
relationship agreements recognize the IMF and the entities of the World Bank
Group as "independent" international organizations.16
The relationship agreements restrict the information that the IMF and the IBRD
are required to provide to the UN. Specifically, no information need be provided
to the UN that either the IMF or the IBRD would judge to constitute a violation
of the confidence of any member or to interfere with the orderly conduct of the
organization's operations.
17
Both the IMF-UN agreement and the IBRD-UN agreement prohibit UN bodies
from making formal recommendations to the IMF or Bank except after "reason-
able prior consultation with regard thereto." 18 That prohibition is buttressed by
the following provision in the IBRD-UN agreement:
The United Nations recognizes that the action to be taken by the Bank on any loan is
a matter to be determined by the independent exercise of the Bank's own judgment in
accordance with the Bank's Articles of Agreement. The United Nations recognizes,
therefore, that it would be sound policy to refrain from making recommendations to
the Bank with respect to particular loans or with respect to terms or conditions of
financing by the Bank. 19
The IMF-UN and IBRD-UN relationship agreements make clear that even UN
Security Council decisions under UN Charter Articles 41 and 42 are not directly
binding on the IMF and World Bank. The language is that each of the two financial
organizations "takes note" of UN Charter Article 48 (making decisions of the
15. Agreement between the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, signed April
15, 1948, entered into force Nov. 15, 1947, 16 UNTS 325; Agreement between the United Nations
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, signed April 15, 1948, entered into
force Nov. 15, 1947, 16 UNTS 341; Agreement between the United Nations and the International
Development Association, entered into force March 27, 1961, 394 UNTS 221; Agreement between
the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Acting on Behalf
of the International Finance Corporation), entered into force Feb. 20, 1957, 265 UNTS 312.
16. IMF-UN agreement, Art. I; IBRD-UN agreement, Art. I.
17. IMF-UN agreement, Art. I; IBRD-UN agreement, Art. I.
18. IMF-UN agreement, Art. IV; IBRD-UN agreement, Art. IV.
19. BRD-UN agreement, Art. IV, para. 3.
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Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 binding on UN members), and obligates
the IMF and World Bank to "have due regard" for Security Council decisions
under Charter Articles 41 and 42.20
The IMF-UN agreement and the IBRD-UN agreement contemplate no role
for the UN General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council of the UN
(ECOSOC) with respect to the budgets of the two organizations. 2' Representatives
of the United Nations have no general right to attend meetings of the executive
boards of the IMF and Bank.22
The World Bank has a formal relationship with the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) and with the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme. The UNDP is an important source of technical assistance to devel-
oping countries. Its assistance is mostly nonmonetary consisting of training
of personnel and the assignment of experts. The UNDP and the World Bank
cooperate to identify and help design development projects. However, the Bank
has found it difficult to rely exclusively on other organizations for specialized
expertise. The Bank found, for example, that it was necessary to develop "in
house" environmental expertise.
One of the reasons why UN influence has not been greater on the work of the
IMF and the World Bank may relate to constituencies. The IMF and World Bank
deal primarily with persons in national finance ministries and national central
banks, and to a much less extent with persons in national foreign ministries. The
UN, by contrast, deals primarily with persons in national foreign ministries.
G. Relationships of the IMF and the World Bank Group with
Each Other and with Other Organizations
Many persons may believe that the IMF and World Bank Group have closer
relations with each other than has proved to be the case. While their boards of
governors hold their annual meetings jointly and many persons serve as governors
(and some even as executive directors) of both organizations, in fact the IMF
and the World Bank Group have not historically had a particularly close working
relationship.
One of the reasons that the organizations have not always worked closely
together is that each has seen its mission differently, reflecting the different
purposes enumerated in their charters. The IMF has been concerned with the
macroeconomic policies of its members, including its most powerful members.
The Bank historically generally had a microeconomic orientation that centered
on particular projects and programs of borrower countries.
20. IMF-UN agreement, Art. VI; IBRD-UN agreement, Art. VI.
21. IMF-UN agreement, Art. X; IBRD-UN agreement, Art. X.
22. IMF-UN Agreement, Art. II; IBRD-UN agreement, Art. II.
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Some changes in the respective roles of the IMF and the World Bank have
occurred in the past decade or so. In response to the debt crises in the early
1980s, the IMF shifted its emphasis from primarily short-term financial assistance
to the medium term. At about the same time, the World Bank began making
loans for "sectoral adjustment"-medium-term loans supporting comprehensive
change in sectors such as agriculture-in addition to loans for specific projects.
With these changes, some operations of the institutions tended to overlap, prompt-
ing some competition and, with it, a need for better coordination between the
IMF and the World Bank. With some "fits and starts," this coordination has
increasingly been achieved. It is now common for IMF staff to be included
in World Bank missions, and vice versa, when financial assistance from both
organizations may be contemplated. However, the missions of the IMF and the
World Bank Group remain distinct. Proposals to merge the two institutions would
not achieve significant efficiencies and would likely undermine the effectiveness
of each organization.
The IMF has working relations with several international organizations that are
not in the "UN family," including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(now succeeded by the new World Trade Organization), the Bank for International
Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development. It also has working relations with the institutions ofthe European
Monetary System and other regional monetary institutions.
The World Bank Group has served as the model for regional development
banks, including the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Develop-
ment Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and (to a lesser extent) the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The World Bank Group has working
relationships with these regional development banks and has participated with
them in coordinated financing activities.
H. Appraisal of the Organizations
When the IMF and World Bank were created near the close of World War
II, the causes of the war, especially economic policies that helped bring on the
war, were in the minds of the founders. There was a strong sense that the lack
of attention to international economic relations by the League of Nations, and
its ineffectiveness in dealing with economic matters, contributed to the outbreak
of World War II. The founders of the IMF and the IBRD contemplated effective
and powerful international institutions that would be the forums for consultation
and the driving engines for collaboration in building a better international eco-
nomic order.
The IMF and the World Bank Group have been key players in the development
of international economic law, both substantive and procedural. They do not
simply administer sets of rules embodied in treaties. They are organic institutions
with ongoing responsibilities.
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(1) APPRAISAL OF THE IMF
The work of the IMF has been intensively appraised from an economic perspec-
tive.23 This appraisal centers on issues that have a legal component.24 It can
be said that the International Monetary Fund "virtually created" international
monetary law, as very little international law relating to monetary matters existed
prior to the IMF's formation.
The purposes of the IMF, stated in the Articles of Agreement, begin with the
idea that the IMF is to be a "permanent institution which provides the machinery
of consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems." 5 The
idea of creating an organic institution and not just rules was a fundamental deci-
sion. This most important of purposes has been achieved.
Exchange Controls: The IMF has played a major role in the liberalization of
trade by what can only be described as "spectacular" work in establishing a
multilateral system of payments in respect of trade and other current transactions.
National foreign exchange restrictions that inhibited trade and other current trans-
actions were widespread and integral to the protectionist practices that prevailed in
1944. Such restrictions have now been virtually eliminated by the major economic
powers and reduced (if not completely eliminated) by most others.26
Financial Assistance: The IMF is best known to the public for the large-scale
financial assistance that it has provided to countries facing balance-of-payments
problems. The IMF's record in providing such assistance has been a good one.
While it is always possible to find fault with a creditor's lending policies, the IMF
has developed policies and practices that have sought to balance in an appropriate
manner the needs of countries in difficulty and the needs to safeguard the financial
integrity of the IMF. The idea is that the IMF should stand ready to provide
large amounts of funds but for only temporary periods.
The IMF's "guidelines on conditionality" reflect the balance. On the one hand,
the guidelines require that the IMF not provide funds to a member country without
a strong showing of commitment on the part of that country to address domestic
economic and financial weaknesses that caused or contributed to the balance-of-
payments problem that prompted the request for IMF financing. On the other hand,
the "conditionality" guidelines require that the IMF "pay due regard to the [partic-
ular country's] domestic social and political objectives, economic priorities, and
23. For recent appraisals from an economic perspective, see PETER B. KENEN (ed.), MANAGING
THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS (1994); and BRETTON WOODS COM-
MISSION, BRETTON WOODS: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE; CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (July 20-24,
1994) and COMMISSION REPORT, STAFF REVIEW, BACKGROUND PAPERS (1994).
24. For a comparable analysis, see Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in
OSCAR SCHACHTER & CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER (eds.), UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER (1995),
vol. I at 503.
25. IMF Articles, Art. I(i).
26. See Toward Full Convertibility, 1995 IMF SURVEY 33.
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the circumstances.' 27 The IMF's lending policies have evolved over time and that
process will continue as the organization seeks to learn from the longer-term experi-
ences of countries to which it has provided assistance.28
Examples: Two examples illustrate how the right to purchase foreign currencies
from the IMF in relatively large quantities provides a "line of defense" for
countries facing a balance-of-payments crisis. In November 1978, following a
persistent decline of the dollar in the exchange markets, the United States pur-
chased Deutsche mark and Japanese yen then equivalent to $3 billion from the
IMF and used SDRs (equivalent to an additional $2 billion) to obtain currencies
for use in stabilizing the dollar's exchange rate. This was done very quickly with
no protracted negotiations.2 9
In early 1995, Mexico faced a currency crisis. Mexico was permitted to draw
immediately currencies equivalent to $7.8 billion from the IMF and entered into
a standby arrangement under which it could draw an additional $10 billion of
currencies from the IMF, for a total equivalent to $17.8 billion. This was an
unprecedented action both for its total size and in relation to Mexico's quota
($17.8 billion is 688 percent of Mexico's quota in the IMF). The IMF arrangement
was critical to working out the Mexico "package" that also involved assistance
from the United States, the Bank for International Settlements, and other coun-
tries, making total credit available of about $52 billion.3 °
Debt Crises: The IMF played a crucial role, both in its own right and as a
catalyst, in dealing with debt crises in the 1980s. While the United States and
other national governments played important parts, the IMF was the leading
international organization involved-working, consulting, and coordinating with
officials in creditor and debtor countries in the so-called Paris Club involved
with official debt rescheduling and with private commercial banks. Often, a key
element of a rescheduling plan was institutional restructuring in the debtor country
supported by an IMF "standby" arrangement.3'
Economies in Transition: Russia and countries in eastern Europe are called
"transitional economies." They are in the process of changing from centrally
27. IMF Executive Board Decision No. 6056 (79/38) (1979), in SELECTED DECISIONS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (19th issue, 1994) at 85. See
also the Executive Board's other general decisions on the use of the IMF's financial resources,
collected id. at 55-192.
28. See, e.g., MARGARET GARRITSEN DE VRIES, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT, 1945-
1986: THE IMF EXPERIENCE (1987); and C. FRED BERGSTEN (ed.), INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT
AND FINANCING: THE LESSONS OF 1985-1991 (1991).
29. See EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 532-34.
30. See IMF to Lend Up to $17.8 Billion to Mexico, 1995 IMF SURVEY 33; and IMF Takes
Exceptional Action to Support Mexican Program, id. at 53. See also Mexico Unveils Program of
Harsh Medicine, WALL ST. J., March 10, 1995, at A3; and Argentina Is Seeking More IMF Funding
as Fallout from Mexican Crisis Continues, WALL ST. J., March 10, 1995, at A6.
31. See generally MARGARET GARRITSEN DE VRIES, THE IMF IN A CHANGING WORLD (1986); V.
SUNDARARAJAN & TOMAS J.T. BALINO (eds.), BANKING CRISES: CASES AND ISSUES (1991); and Jo-
seph Gold, Prospects for International Lending and Reschedulings (SMU Institute Intl Finance, 1988).
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planned "command economies" to more open "market economies" where eco-
nomic decision making is decentralized and where the price system plays a key
role in the allocation of economic resources and labor. The IMF has provided
support to these countries both in the form of technical assistance and large-scale
financing. It is too early to make judgments about the successes and failures of
the IMF in working with its members engaged in such dynamic times. As com-
mented later, structural reform is legal reform. The role of lawyers is as important
to the success of structural reform as the role of economists.32
Technical Assistance: Although not mentioned explicitly as a purpose, the
IMF has played an important role in providing technical assistance to its members.
This has included legal assistance in drafting central bank legislation, reform of
currency exchange controls, and other matters. The importance of the work of
the IMF and other organizations (including the Central and East European Law
Initiative of the American Bar Association [CEELI]) has become more apparent
to the general bar when seeing the current challenges facing countries of Eastern
Europe. However, this is not a new area of work for the IMF. Since its founding,
it has provided technical legal assistance in domestic legal matters relating to
monetary law to its member countries.
Exchange Rates and Capital Movements: It is with respect to exchange stability
that the IMF has been most incisively criticized. Today, exchange rate instability,
rather than stability, seems to be the norm. However, there are different views
among economists and officials about what is meant by "exchange stability"
and "orderly exchange arrangements." Is the purpose primarily to maintain
orderly exchange arrangements in the sense of system stability or is rate stability
to be the goal? Economists and officials differ regarding whether floating ex-
change rates are desirable over the long term or are only to be tolerated as a
temporary fact of life. In any event, the par value system that contemplated stable
exchange rates embodied in the original Articles of Agreement was replaced in
the 1970s by softer rules that have allowed national authorities greater freedom
in choosing and modifying exchange arrangements.33
Let us now turn to concerns today that were not on the agenda in 1944. In
1944 national restrictions on exchange and international financial transactions
were the norm. At that time only the United States and Canada had liberal regimes.
By the early 1960s restrictions on payments for current international transactions
32. See note 38, infra, and accompanying text. See also Assessing the Reform Record in Transi-
tional Economies, 1995 IMF SURVEY 2; and Russia and the IMF to Sign Loan Pact of $625 Billion
Amid Doubt on Reforms, WALL ST. J., March 10, 1995, at A6. For criticism of the IMF's dealings
with Russia, see Jeffrey Sachs, The Reformer's Tragedy: How the IMF Pushed Russia to the Brink,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, at E17.
33. Actions taken by international organizations and national courts when dealing with uncertain-
ties caused by fluctuating exchange rates are examined by JOSEPH GOLD, LEGAL EFFECTS OF FLUCTU-
ATING EXCHANGE RATES (1990). See also JOSEPH GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1988), for an exhaustive examination of the international legal regime
applicable to exchange rates.
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were by and large eliminated in the economically powerful countries. In the last
25 years restrictions on capital movements have been radically reduced. Private
participation in the exchange markets has grown dramatically. The result is an
international financial market whose size is so large as to be almost impossible
to fathom. While active exchange markets and freedom of capital flows transna-
tionally have many positive aspects for economic growth, there are also negative
aspects that deserve attention.
A whole industry has developed composed of persons (usually employed by
commercial banks and investment houses) who seek to detect incipient movements
in exchange rates and to "get on the bandwagon early." The result has been both
sharp and rapid movements in exchange rates and general exchange instability as
participants in the market (primarily commercial banks) widen their "bid" and
"asked" quotations for currency exchanges whenever the market appears unset-
tled. The impact of large, essentially "speculative," short-term capital move-
ments on exchange rates has frustrated the IMF in the performance of one of its
primary purposes-the promotion of exchange stability.34
National monetary authorities, even when they cooperate among themselves,
have difficulty regulating, or even influencing, the conduct of commercial banks
and other private entities that engage in transnational financial operations. Effective
regulation of global securities and exchange markets probably requires regulation
that itself is global as compared to national. Consideration needs to be given to an
enlarged role for the IMF in the close monitoring of large capital movements and
possible exercise of direct regulatory powers over private financial institutions.
Relations with Powerful Countries: Another challenge that has faced and con-
tinues to face the IMF is how to deal effectively (maintain a degree of discipline)
with its most powerful members. This is particularly apparent in the exchange-rate
area. Achievement of greater exchange rate stability is probably dependent upon
the more powerful members being subjected to a tighter legal regime than is the
case at present.
(2) APPRAISAL OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP36
Shift in Loan Portfolio: The World Bank Group institutions complement each
other and provide a range of financing techniques that can be tailored to the
situation of the beneficiary country. While the World Bank is probably best
known to the public for the large infrastructure projects that it has financed (e.g.,
34. IF Articles, Art. I(iii) and Art. IV, sec. 1.
35. See Stephen Zamora, Regulating the Global Banking Network: What Role for the IMF? 62
FORD. L. REV. 1953 (1994); and Richard W. Edwards, Jr., International Monetary Law: The Next
Twenty-Five Years, 25 VAND. J. INT'L L. 209 at 222-23 (1992).
36. For appraisals of the World Bank on its 50th anniversary in 1994, see BRETrON WOODS
COMMISSION, supra note 23; KENEN, supra note 23; and Harry Owen, The World Bank: Is 50 Years
Enough? 73 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, no. 5 at 97 (Sept./Oct. 1994). See also SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK
IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 2.
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highly visible hydroelectric dams), much of its financing (especially in recent
years) has gone to smaller projects, including some "micro-credit" loans intended
to give financial support to small entrepreneurs. The continuing efforts of the
World Bank Group to strengthen the private sector should be noted. In addition,
some IBRD and IDA lending in recent years has been "program lending" and
"sectoral adjustment lending." Program lending is finance in support of regula-
tory and institutional reforms in particular areas of a country's economy such as
energy, agriculture, or education. Sectoral adjustment lending provides financing
during the transitional period when fundamental institutional changes are made
affecting industry, agriculture, and labor as the country moves, for example,
from a command-economy to a market-oriented economy.
The United States should consider increasing the level of its financial contribu-
tions to the International Development Association. IDA development financing
goes where such financing is most needed and is not available from other sources-
that is, to the economically poorest countries. IDA's assistance in the improve-
ment of agriculture resulted in the so-called green revolution that has led to
agricultural self-sufficiency in such countries as India. As mentioned below under
Technical Assistance, IDA financing can leverage broad-scale legal reform which
private financing cannot do effectively. Every dollar contributed by the U.S.
generates about five dollars from other contributors. IDA projects build markets
for U.S. goods. As noted earlier, the U.S. contribution in 1993 of $2.7 billion
was balanced by revenues of $5 billion to U.S. vendors and contractors.
IFC: The IFC has historically centered its attention on the "project deal"
rather than the broader investment environment. Most of the IFC's investments
have been in the "better off' developing countries. The IFC should give more
attention to the cultivation of private investment opportunities in countries that
are not as well off as those to which it has devoted most of its attention in
the past. It needs to work more closely with the Bank in identifying domestic
institutional changes (law reform) as part of a development strategy in which
private investment is an integral feature.37
Technical Assistance: From its beginning, the World Bank has seen technical
assistance as an integral part of its activities. A successful hydroelectric project,
to take an example, not only requires sound engineering design, but creation and
reform of legal institutions that set the rates for electric power sales, that determine
the release of water for agricultural purposes, that allocate funds for maintenance,
that assure funds are available to meet debt service obligations, and the like.
One of the advantages that the World Bank Group enjoys comes from its intergov-
ernmental public character. When its assistance is contemplated, it can involve it-
self in broad-scale institutional reform in a way that would be seen as inappropriate
for a foreign private lender or investor, or even for an individual government. In
37. See generally RICHARD W. RICHARDSON & JONAS H. HARALZ, MOVING TO MARKET: THE
WORLD BANK IN TRANSITION (Overseas Development Council, 1995).
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addition, the Bank acts as a clearinghouse which collects "best practices" from
around the world and disseminates those experiences to member countries.
Institutional Reform: The World Bank Group, like the IMF, deals with matters
that governments have traditionally treated as outside the scope of international
review-domestic taxation, spending, fiscal policy, and industrial policy. The suc-
cess of the Bank when consulting with countries on these matters and building them
into reform programs to be supported by Bank financial assistance hinges in large
measure on the expertise of Bank personnel, the soundness of the policy recommen-
dations, and the perception that the Bank and its personnel are fair and impartial.
Role of Legal Reform: The World Bank Group has tended to see reform in
economic terms. While there are economists at all levels of the Bank's operations,
lawyers tend to be concentrated in the Bank's Legal Department. Lawyers are
rarely involved in substantive project design or ongoing policy dialogue with
member governments. Lawyers could play valuable roles in other areas of the
Bank, especially in groups that negotiate and design sectoral adjustment programs.
Economists may not always appreciate the complex legal and institutional under-
pinnings that a market economy requires. Structural reform is primarily legal
reform. 38 Legal reform is fundamental to sustainable development. The Bank
will increasingly require access to sophisticated legal skills as its lending mix
continues to shift towards enabling private investment and away from the former
state-driven physical investment mold.
For example, there is a need to involve lawyers more effectively and to improve
coordination among organizations that provide training support in Eastern Europe
to countries in transition from centrally planned to market-based economies. The
principal multilateral institutions have made an effort to coordinate their activities
and more could be done. The Joint Vienna Institute established by an agreement
among the IMF, IBRD, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Bank for
International Settlements 9 is an example of cooperation.
Environment and Human Rights: The World Bank has been criticized in the
past for adverse environmental impacts of some of the major projects that it has
financed-including deforestation and large-scale forced movements of persons.
The Bank has brought onto its staff experts in assessing environmental impacts.a4
Environmental assessment is now an integral part of project planning. In fact,
38. See Cheryl W. Gray, Rebecca J. Hanson, Michael A. Heller, Peter G. Ianachkov & Daniel
T. Ostas, The Legal Framework for Private Sector Development in a Transitional Economy: The
Case of Poland, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 283 (1992); and Cheryl W. Gray, Rebecca J. Hanson
& Michael A. Heller, Hungarian Legal Reform for the Private Sector, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 293 (1992).
39. Agreement for the Establishment of the Joint Vienna Institute, entered into force Aug. 19,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1505.
40. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and the Environment: A Legal Perspective, 16
MD.J. INT'LL. & TRADE 1 (1992); and John W. Head, Environmental Conditionality in the Operations
of the International Development Finance Institutions, 1 KAN. J. L. & POLY 15 (1991).
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the environmental assessment reports on projects proposed for World Bank fund-
ing are now made available to the public. However, environmental impact is
more than a project-by-project matter. Environmental improvement must be an
integral part of development strategy.
The Bank has also been chastised for being insensitive to the human rights
records of some of the governments to which it has made loans.4 ' The Bank,
while still resisting outside efforts that intrude upon its lending jurisdiction, has
come to recognize the human dimension of successful development. The Bank
should continue to adjust its policies to see the promotion of human rights (what
sometimes are called "governance issues") as integral to economic develop-
ment. 42
(3) IMF AND WORLD BANK ACCOUNTABILITY
At several places in this report, the need for the IMF and the World Bank
Group to be more accountable to governments and to the public has been pointed
out. However, it is important that these organizations not become the puppets
of particular states or groups. When change is needed in the IMF or World Bank
Group, the United States should seek to build a consensus for change and should
avoid, to the extent possible, unilateral actions. An example of a fruitful initiative
was the congressional action in the early 1990s to require the U.S. Executive
Director in the IBRD to withhold support for World Bank financing for any
project unless an environmental impact assessment was released prior to the
Executive Board's consideration of a project loan. 43 The insistence by the United
States in the early 1990s on an amendment to the IMF's Articles of Agreement
(to add a new form of punishment for those few members that are delinquent in
loan repayments) was counterproductive because of the ill will it engendered. 44
Threats to cut off U.S. funding or to condition it on certain actions by the World
Bank are usually ill-advised.
Concerns have been raised about the secretiveness of the IMF and the World
Bank, and calls have been made for an "improvement of transparency." Meetings
of the executive boards are not open to the public or press. Information about
what transpired at those meetings may only become available with a delay of
41. For tension between the World Bank and the UN relating to bank lending in the 1960s and
human rights, see 1967 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 109-131.
42. See document entitled "The World Bank and the Promotion of Human Rights" submitted
to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/61/Add. 19 (1993).
See also WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992); LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1993); and Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record of
Achievements, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 39 (1988).
43. U.S. International Financial Institutions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 262m-7.
44. See John W. Head, Suspension of Debtor Countries' Voting Rights in the IMF: An Assessment
of the Third Amendment to the IMF's Charter, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 591 (1993).
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years. On the other hand, some commercial banks appear to have "effective
intelligence networks." They have been able to obtain, often through national
officials, IMF and World Bank documents that are supposed to be confidential.
This raises questions about who outside the IMF and World Bank is and should
be privy to unpublished materials.
The Executive Board of the World Bank in September 1993 established an
Inspection Panel.45 The panel is composed of persons who are knowledgeable
about the Bank's work but independent of the Bank. The panel provides a mecha-
nism for review of the Bank's policies and practices and a measure of external
public accountability.
Similar steps should be taken in the IMF. The organizations policies and actions
have profound impacts on the international economy and national economies.
Its financial resources are huge. In addition to procedures for auditing the uses of
its funds, there is a need for independence in program and performance evaluation.
Indeed, since the IMF's use of funds often triggers the availability of other global
credit, thought should be given to instituting procedures that will provide greater
accountability-both internally and externally-for all of the actions of the IMF.
It is only in relatively recent years that nongovernmental organizations have
given informed attention to the work of the financial organizations. The IMF
and the World Bank Group need to improve the mechanisms for dealing produc-
tively with nongovernmental citizen organizations, commercial banks, and other
private bodies.46 Specifically, a new set of policies and procedures for information
sharing and consultation with these groups should be developed, along the lines
of recent World Bank efforts to involve beneficiaries and nongovernmental orga-
nizations in the design and implementation of projects.
I. Conclusion
The IMF and the World Bank Group make valuable contributions to the global
economic order. They deserve continued support from the United States. A few
areas in which change would be desirable have been identified in the recommenda-




45. IBRD Res. 93-10 (Sept. 23, 1993); IDA Res. 93-6 (Sept 23, 1993). See generally IBRAHIM
F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL (1994); and David D. Bradlow, International
Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 553 (1994). See also, A World Bank Panel Breaks Legal Ground, NATL L.J., Dec. 19,
1994, at 1.
46. See Ibrahim F.. Shihata, The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations, 25 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 623 (1992). See also Bradlow, supra note 45.
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